By Jacob K. Lupai
In a series of workshops for the ten southern states the Southern Sudan Anti-corruption Commission (SSACC) on 11-12 August 2010 held a workshop for Central Equatoria State in South Sudan Hotel in Juba. Presentations included Strategy and Action Plan 2010-2014, and Operational Guidelines for Reporting Corruption.
In theory what the SSACC is attempting to do is fantastic. However, in practice there may be a question mark when the SSACC has been around for some time.
According to the Operational Guidelines for Reporting Corruption (February 2010) “It is so widely recognized that senior government officials are often in the best position to observe, intervene and report corrupt practices and corruption; therefore the Southern Sudan Anti-corruption Commission Act 2009 requires all ‘Public Officials’ to report corruption”. In addition “Any Executive or legislative constitution office holder, Justice or senior civil servant who has knowledge of corrupt practice and fails to report the same to the Commission commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine or with both”.
The question to ask is, what will happen when an Executive or legislative constitution office holder, Justice or senior civil servant does not come forward to report a corrupt practice of which they are knowledgeable. How long has the SSACC to wait to uncover a corrupt practice reported by officials? Also in the workshop participants were urged to report any corrupt practice but must provide evidence or the SSACC may drop the case for lack of evidence not provided by the official reporting. This does not sound like the SSACC is powerful and effective in tackling corruption.
May be the SSACC has started on the wrong foot. First of all the fine is not specific as the term of imprisonment is. Secondly how will the SSACC know that an official has knowledge of corrupt practice in their unit or department in order to convict the official? The media is full of cases of corruption.
One participant in the workshop raised the issue of the Nile Commercial Bank (NCB) that has gone out of business partly due to gross mismanagement and partly due to default in loan payments. It was difficult to understand how the SSACC which was all about fighting corruption could not have taken the issue of the NCB seriously as a test case of its commitment “towards a corruption-free Southern Sudan”.
However, the SSACC representative said when the Bank of Southern Sudan wanted to publish the list of borrowers from the NCB, the publication of the list was stopped allegedly by higher authorities. The higher authorities were not specified. This seems to suggest the lack of political will to address corruption despite the rhetoric on prevention of corruption in Southern Sudan. Probably the corrupt are so powerful, like the Sicilian Mafia in Italy that the establishment can only struggle.
It was not clear whether the SSACC was also stopped from investigating the causes of the collapse of the NCB. However, the information was that there was an on-going investigation. However, how long have people to wait for the result for the investigation?
I have reason to be bitter and impatient. In its inception I was the one individual who had shares in the NCB in three digits. In a message to me the managing director said he shed tears for seeing me as a nationalist investing in the nascent NCB. The managing director even proposed me to be the NCB representative for Europe because by then I was in the United Kingdom. I have now realized that probably those were crocodile tears and the proposal for me as the representative was to flatter me while the motive of starting the NCB might have been to swindle the unsuspecting like me.
I paid for 173 shares in the inception of the NCB and according to my Certificate of Shareholding a share was 100 US dollars as on 25 March 2008. I only borrowed 6,000 SDG from the NCB and paid back the loan promptly. I did not realize then that the NCB was involved in massive granting of loans probably as favours to individuals who couldn’t care much about the growth of the NCB but only about themselves. I wonder who are and where are southern nationalists if what appears to be excessive looting is taking place while a national bank like the NCB is being starved of resources.
In his closing remarks in the workshop the Governor of Central Equatoria State lamented the poor performance of the State Revenue Authority. The Governor said tax collectors are better off than senior officials. This is a glimpse of corruption in State Revenue Authority. With corruption being spoken of as in the remarks of the Governor the SSACC should have many lines of enquiries to establish the extent of corruption for example in the State Revenue Authority.
What, however, seems to be lacking is a serious fraud office (SFO) charged with intensive investigation allegations of corruption. The establishment of a telephone hotline could be helpful. The hotline should be open to the members of public to pass a message of any suspicious activity both in the government and non-governmental organizations. There should also be an intelligent unit to gather information on corruption.
Relying only on officials to report on their colleagues for corruption and also for the officials to provide evidence is hardly a method that will tackle corruption as expected. Instead of waiting for reports on corruption from officials the SSACC should have been on the lookout for any lead through any other means. Waiting for reports from officials may be indefinite with the movement towards corruption-free Southern Sudan a distant probability.
Newspapers and magazines are full of corruption related issues. For example, in the Juba Post of 09-13 July 2009, 6.26 billion Sudanese pounds were allegedly lost in bad food security plan. This would have been food for thought to the SSACC to carry out its own investigation to establish what precisely had happened and whether there was a case of corruption.
Also in Sudanic magazine of March/April 2008 an opinion poll showed the Government of Southern Sudan was seen as 90 per cent corrupt. What did the SSACC make of such an opinion poll? Presumably it could have been said it was only an opinion poll. However, it is said there is no smoke without fire. Surely there could have been issues of interest raised in the opinion poll that should have warranted an investigation either to confirm or discredit the opinion poll.
The SSACC should establish an SFO if it does not have one already. The SFO should be staffed with well trained fraud investigators who will have the skills to collect evidence of corruption. The SSACC should be on the move to investigate allegations of corruption. It should not fold their arms only to wait, may be endlessly, for officials to come forward with reports on corruption. It should be seen as the forerunner in the fight against corruption. The SSACC should act like a sniffer dog to sniff out corruption before irreparable damage is done.
The SSACC should not be waiting until, for example, the Minister of Public Service of the Government of Southern Sudan has to call on the “SSACC to intervene on ghost workers through the media (The Juba Post, 12th_16th August 2010). Wasn’t the SSACC aware of the ghost workers people were already talking about since then?
We are told there will be “zero tolerance on corruption” and “If you swallow something that belongs to the people, we will force you to vomit it out”. This is encouraging indeed and shows the best of intentions. However, the phrase “we will force you to vomit it out” seems to be difficult to put into practice. This is because others have borrowed (swallowed) people’s money from the NCB and virtually seem to have refused to pay (vomit) back the money which has resulted to the collapse of the NCB.
The implication is that words without action do not help. It seems obvious that the SSACC investigative activities may be compromised because it is not so free to operate as perfectly as it could. If the SSACC had investigated the causes of the collapse of the NCB and had wanted to publish its findings probably it could have been stopped like when the list of the NCB defaulters was stopped from being published.
In conclusion the SSACC is not as powerful and effective as expected in tackling corruption because it does not sniff out corruption as a sniffer dog does in sniffing out cocaine from a container of various items. It was a pity that the NCB was collapsing and eventually went out of business under the very nose of the SSACC without anybody being held responsible and persecuted. Those senior managers who were unceremoniously dismissed from the NCB may now be running their own businesses and only God knows with whose capital while shareholders and ordinary customers are in distress.
It is hoped that one day somebody whether in hiding will be held responsible and persecuted for the unnecessary distress caused to unsuspecting shareholders and customers. For now the SSACC may need to justify with real verifiable success stories why it should exist when resources are needed for infrastructure projects such as roads, electricity, clean drinking water and investment in food security to mention but a few to improve the quality of life of people.
The author can be reached at jklupai@googlemail.com