Eric Reeves
November 9, 2009
With growing inevitability, Sudan has begun what the evidence suggests is a final lurch toward renewed North-South war—and the likely spread of intense fighting to other marginalized areas, including Kordofan, southern Blue Nile, Kassala and Red Sea states, Nubia, and most ominously Darfur.
For the Darfuri rebel groups will certainly see the outbreak of war between Khartoum’s forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army as an occasion for overcoming the prevailing military stalemate in the west.
War will begin when Khartoum decides that it has nothing further to gain from its merely nominal commitment to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)—or when Southerners become convinced that the bedrock principle of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement—a Southern self-determination referendum guaranteed in the Machakos Protocol (July 2002)—will not be honored by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) regime. Whether in the form of a unilateral abrogation of yet another agreement by Khartoum or a unilateral Southern declaration of independence, the moment of most desperate truth for millions of Sudanese will have arrived.
In the short term Khartoum may still decide that its interests lie in making temporary concessions on the referendum legislation that was to have been passed more than two years ago. But recent public comments, from both the Southern political leadership and Khartoum officials, suggest that this is growing less likely.
Moreover, several other key issues impinge on the final meaning of the self-determination referendum, including a demarcation of the North-South border; the final status of Abyei (which is to have its own self-determination referendum, with the choice of joining the South); the role of a deeply compromised census favoring Khartoum on virtually every demographic issue; and the use to which the regime will put the April 2010 national elections, which have already been delayed twice and now lie only five months off. Further delay would push these elections into the rainy season and make an already overwhelming logistical challenge
utterly impossible.
Moreover, Khartoum’s manipulation of the electoral results has already begun in earnest, reflecting an understanding that neither party to the CPA can now afford to be seen as initiating a call for further delay of the elections. The SPLM in particular would be inviting postponement of the self-determination referendum with any call for delay, a point recently made by long-time Sudan observer John Ashworth in a powerfully informed report on the CPA (“CPA Alert No. 1,” IKV Pax Christi, September 2009 at
http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/news/?v=2&cid=1&id=780&lid=3). Ashworth goes on to note:
“A further danger lies in recent statements by the [NIF/]NCP ‘that any action to stop the next year elections would threaten the political stability in the country and endanger the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ in response to calls from opposition parties to boycott the elections. This is a very worrying statement as it could be seen as a precursor to a State of Emergency and other drastic security-led actions in the name of ‘political stability,’ and could be an excuse to put implementation of the CPA on hold ‘temporarily.’” (page 16)
Given the virtual certainty that Southerners—if afforded the chance—will vote for secession, and by a margin likely in excess of ninety percent, urgent negotiations should begin now on the terms with
which the new country of South Sudan will be established. Facilitating such negotiations between Khartoum and the present Government of South Sudan should have been central to the highly belated Sudan policy announced by the Obama administration on October 19. Clear recommendations should have been made for diplomatic roles by Sudanese parties (including non-CPA signatories), the African Union, the European Union, and the US itself.
Instead, the State Department’s “comprehensive” policy document of October 19, 2009 speaks only vaguely of… “implementation of the North-South CPA that results in a peaceful post-2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at peace with each other,”
and working…
“with international partners to support the parties in developing a post-2011 wealth-sharing agreement and other post-2011 political and economic issues.” (“Sudan: A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach,” Office of the Spokesman, State Department, Washington, DC, October 19, 2009).
But there are a great many such “political and economic” issues, and it is not at all clear that the Obama administration understands just how difficult negotiations will become as the deadline for the referendum looms closer.
Division of oil wealth will surely prove the most contentious issue, even as it has been the primary reason for the long delay in resolving the status of the Abyei region, and the continuing failure by Khartoum to negotiate and demarcate the North-South border. Most of the oil reserves lie in the South and along the border, even as the oil pipeline and infrastructure lie in the north; some equitable sharing of oil wealth will have to be established if the border region is ever to be stabilized, but this will require both time and good will, both of which are diminishing quantities. The newly announced US policy speaks of quarterly interagency assessments of progress. But one quarter hence and the April 2010 elections will lie only two months further off; the self-determination referendum itself will lie less than a year off.
There are other extremely difficult bilateral issues to be negotiated, none made easier by the increasing compression of the electoral calendar: customs, tariffs, and immigration regulations must be determined; overland and air transport arrangements finalized; the terms of citizenship for Southerners in the North decided; the massive external debt the NIF/NCP has run up (much used for military acquisitions) fairly apportioned; and a military stand-down overseen by an international peacekeeping force (the present UN force—UNMIS—will need substantial reconfiguration and redeployment). All will demand near-term and intense negotiations if a “soft landing” is to follow the inevitably wrenching effects of secession. For the truth could not be clearer: Khartoum has failed miserably in “making unity attractive” to the people of South Sudan….
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org