By Steve Paterno
The regime in Khartoum has sets of assumptions that determine its courses of action or inaction, and these have thus far enables it to maintain grip of power for over two decades. These assumptions are what informed the regime's strategies, in tune with the times.
When Khartoum decided to negotiate and signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with SPLM/A, several factors were in play, both internally and internationally. Internally, there was the war fatigue, which created stalemate along the battle fields.
However, despite this fact, Khartoum felt it has a slight edge against the SPLM/A. By then, Khartoum was already pumping billions of dollars worth of oil money, the bulk of which was for upgrading its military capabilities. When both sides came into the negotiating table in 2002, each was seeking to negotiate from the position of strength. While negotiating, they never agreed on ceasefire, meaning that each one of the parties can gain leverage over the negotiating table through winning in the battle fields.
The SPLM/A started by attacking and overrunning Khartoum's forces from the strategic town of Torit. With the victory in the battle field, SPLM/A was sure had an upper hand in negotiations, but Khartoum immediately pulled out from the peace talks, vowing to only return after recapturing of Torit.
After massive mobilizations for several weeks, Khartoum made good on its promise by retaking Torit.
A day later, Khartoum's ambassador in Lebanon, Ahmed al-Bakhit set the tone on behalf of the regime as he declared, “we will return to the negotiating table, but we will return on our terms: the cessation of assaults and no discussion of issues we have already talked about.” With the stage already set, the SPLM/A capitulated under the table.
Since then, Khartoum began to believe with confidence that it has advantage over SPLM/A, whether through military, political or economic means. Throughout the interim period of the CPA, Khartoum becomes in a better position to accurately assess the real strengths and weaknesses of SPLM/A. On several occasions, Khartoum actually tested the capabilities of SPLM/A and exploited on the weaknesses.
The recent forceful seizer of Abyei is the latest in a series of this regime's blatant bravado. In the wake of this flagrant violation, the defiant Khartoum's President Omar al-Bashir mockingly asserted that his regime is “prepared for war and going back to the battles of the 40th mile and Torit.”
The massage here is plain and clear. For one, President al-Bashir is underscoring the historic significance of Torit as the place where the first bullets of resistance against Khartoum were fired. Secondly, al-Bashir is setting the tone for South-North war, since Torit is strategically located at the most Southern tip of the map and the town is also bordering international boundaries. Thirdly, al-Bashir is aware of the importance of the town to SPLM/A, because during the trying moment for the movement, after the split within the movement, that was where SPLM/A survived and even at one point the movement carried the name of the town, SPLM/A-Torit faction; to identify itself with. And finally, al-Bashir wants to remind the SPLM/A of the year 2002, where the battle of Torit became the decisive factor at the peace negotiations.
Nonetheless, the real aim of Khartoum is not to wage the same South-North war like the previous conflict. The regime is actually glad the South has gone, because it saves their necks. At this point and time, Khartoum is not willing to send the Khadijah boys, known as the Mujahideen, to march deep into South Sudanese jungles for their ultimate demise.
The recent war is too reflective and vivid in memories. Most of the Mujahideen sent to South were simply dying of mosquito bites and unidentified tropical diseases, before they could even take bullets from their supposed opponents. The intention of Khartoum is to deploy different tactics and strategies to exploit the South in equal measures as it has been doing.
The most immediate goal is now to retain Abyei and those oil fields around the border areas. The occupation of Abyei is one step in achieving such immediate goals, because in any negotiations on Abyei and border issues, the regime already has the upper hand—once again, underscoring the point of negotiating from the position of strength.
In a long run, Khartoum's strategy is to maintain a destabilized South by using proxies, infamously known as the militias. These militias are in abundance within South Sudan and across the Northern borders. The aim is for the South Sudanese militia to continue to challenge any existing legitimate South Sudanese authorities within the heart of South Sudan, while the Arab militias will perform their usual cross border raids, unabated. As a result, a destabilized South will guarantee Khartoum free flow of oil and full access to other resources from the South.
Back in 2002, Khartoum was feeling pressure from international community, specifically due to war on terrorism. The then US President George W. Bush drew the line and made it clear to the entire world that in the war of terrorism, you are either with us or with terrorists. Khartoum got the message and jumped on the US bandwagon, becoming strategic ally of America on war on terrorism, after having been the sponsors and host of terrorists.
Currently, the international community pressure on Khartoum naturally died away. The cooperation between US and Khartoum, particularly the public declarations by the US administration such as “America has no leverage” over the regime in Khartoum, seems to assure the regime a clean slate. Referring to American policy of “carrot and stick” as a measure of US policy toward Khartoum, President al-Bashir, reassured his base that they will “no longer fear the American stick nor do they desire its carrots.”
spite international community condemnation on the recent actions of Khartoum, the regime confidently feels that no one from the international community can really affect the actual situation on the ground. Therefore, it is the regime that determines the course of action. This view is supported by the fact that the officials from this regime intentionally skipped to meet with the recent visiting delegation of United Nation Security Council.
Thus far, the sets of assumptions that Khartoum is operating under, seem to continue to serve the interest of the regime very well. Hence, it is incumbent to the SPLM/A in particular and the South Sudanese in general, as well as the international community to provide Khartoum with its dose of medicine. This will require the SPLM/A not just to be a stronger opponent to Khartoum, but also a sophisticated opponent, with enough wit to out maneuver Khartoum in both political arena and in the military theater as well as in economic endeavors.
South Sudan, which is barely emerging out of devastation of decades of war has not much to loose in a renewed South-North war. The oil facilities, which Khartoum relies on for its revenues, can easily be bombed and carpeted aground. It is also an opportune time for those South Sudanese who are acting as proxies of Khartoum's regime to rethink their actions and join ranks with their fellow Southerners, in order to face the real monster in Khartoum.
In the meantime, the international community can do a whole lot, from issuing credible threats and pressure against Khartoum into supporting the causes of South Sudan and the other marginalized regions. The US, as always can take a lead in such efforts. Matter of fact, America, over the years has actually done much better along this front. There is an active American law, known as the Sudan Peace Act, which guarantees continuous support to South Sudan and the marginalized regions, worth millions of dollars annually. Such law can be activated, and those millions of dollars can assist in sustaining a long war against Khartoum's regime until it capitulates.